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NOTES
CONFLICTS OF LAW AND USURY-WHAT LAW GOVERNS
A problem of great importance is the question of which law
should apply to determine whether a contract for the payment of
money is usurious when the contract is in fact related to more than
one jurisdiction.' This question arises when a contract is made in
one state and is to be performed in another; this being further
complicated when the residence of the parties and location of the
securities are still in other states.
INTENT AND GOOD FAITH
In determining the applicable law in cases of conflicting usury
law, the fundamental principle recognized by the over-whelming
weight of authority is to ascertain the-intentions of the parties and
to apply the law with reference to which they intended to con-
tract.2 This intent, however, must have been made in good faith
so as not to evade the laws of the state to which the contract is
otherwise referable,3 even though reference would result in enforc-
ing a contract that could. not have been legally made in the state
of the forum.
4
The existence of good faith must be determined by a considera-
lion of all .the facts involved.5 However, this method of determining
good faith must not be applied .too strictly. To do so could defeat
the "intention rule" itself. The fact that the. laws of the .place-in-
tended by the parties to govern permit a higher rate of interest
than that allowed by the law of the actual situs of the contracdt or
that the parties in selecting the applicable law were actuated by a
motive to avail themselves of the higher rate of interest allowed bY
that law, is not in itself indicative of an intention to evade the
1. It is necessary to make a distinction between the validity of a ."ordinay' contract
on the one hand, and the validity of a "usurious" contract on the othetw In the former
the authorities are in great confusion as to what law governs the validity. of a contract,
and the same court will often enunciate inconsistent theories. The courts have:iid. down
three general rules: (1) the law of the place of making; (2) the law of the place of
performance; (3) the law intended by the parties. See GOODRICH Conflict: of. Laws g
110 (3d ed. 1949); Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract, 2,3 Hare. L.
Rev. 945 (1920). This confusion is not apparent in usury cases,, however.
2. Seeman v. Phliadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U. S. 40 3 (1927);" Pritshard v. Norton,
106 U.S. 124 (1882); O'Toole v.. Meysenburg, 251 FedJc9:1 (8th Cir. 1918), cet.
denied, 248 U.S. 583 (1919); Kellogg v. Miller, 13 Fed.:198- (C.C.D. Neb. 1881) (the
intention of the parties constitutes an exception to the rule that the law of the place whete
the contract is made must govern in enforcingit); State v. Rivers, 206 Minn. 85, 287.N.W.
790 (1939); Bowmen'v. Price, 145 Term. 366, 226 S.W. 210 (1920).
3. Arnold v. Potter, 22 Iowa 194 (1867).
4. Bundy v. Commercial Credit Co., 200 N.C. 511, 157 S.E., 860 (1931).
5. Coghlan v. South Carolina R. Co.''142 U.S. 101 (1891); Arnold v. Potter, 22 Iowa.
194 (1887); State v. Rivers, 206 Minn. 85, 287 N.W. 790 (1939).
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usury laws of such situs of the contract.' The contract is enforceable
providing the place whose law is selected to govern has a natural
contact to some vital element of the contract.7
VITAL ELEMENT AND NATURAL CONTACT
The question then arises as to what are the vital elements to
which the law must have a natural contact? There is authority to
the effect that the parties may refer to the law of the place where
payment is to be made,8 and also authority to the effect that the
parties may refer to the place of conracting. 9 Even though the
choice of governing law is generally limited to these alternatives,
the circumstances of the transaction may permit reference to the
law of the state where a party is domiciled and which is also the
situs of the security, although the contract was made and is payable
elsewhere. 16 There is even dictum to the effect that validity under
the law of the situs of the realty securing the contract sued upon
would alone be sufficient to uphold the contract.1
PUBLIC POLICY
The "intention rule" is of course subject to the qualification that
it would not be against the public policy of the forum to enforce a
contract nonusurious as tested by the law designated by the parties,
or other applicatory law, but usurious as tested by the local law. 12
Comity does not require courts, of one state to enforce contracts
made in another state when such contract is contrary to the public
policy of the forum; 3 however, it is not, generally speaking, against
public policy to enforce a contract usurious at the forum but valid
at the situs.'4
6. See Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403 (1927).
7. Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., supra note 6; Brierly v. Commercial Credit
Co., 43 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1930). See London Finance Co. v. Shattuck, 221 N.Y. 702,
117 N.E. 1075 (1917) (the relation with the state to uphold the instrument must be
actual and not fictitious).
8. Coghlan v. South Carolina R. Co., 142 U.S. 101, 109 (1891).
9. Miller v. Tiffany, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 298 (1864); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 332 (1934).
10. Fahs v. Martin, 224 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1955); Armstrong v. Alliance Trust Co.,
88 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1937). Contra, Patterson v. Wyman, 142 Minn. 70, 170 N.W.
928 (1919).
11. Arnold v. Potter, 22 Iowa 194, 200 (1867). But see Gold-Stabeck Loan and Credit
Co., v. Kinney, 33 N.D. 495, 157 N.W. 482 (1916) (where contract was made and
payable in other states but situs of security was in North Dakota); J.I. Case Threshing
Machine Co. v. Tomlin, 174 Mo. App. 512, 161 S.W. 286 (1913) ("...[U]sury inheres
in the loan and not in the property given to secure its payment...," so the law of the
state where the loan is payable governs, as to usury).
12. O'Toole v. Meysenburg, 251 Fed. 191 (8th Cir. 1918), cert denied, 248 U.S. 583
(1918).
13. Continental Supply Co. v. Syndicate Trust Co., 52 N.D. 83, 202 N.W. 404, 409
(1924).
14. O'Toole v. Meysenburg, 251 Fed. 191 (8th Cir. 1918), cert denied,, 248 U.S.
583 (1919); Personal Finance Co. v. Gibson; 26 Ala. App. 18, 152 So. 462, cert. denied,
228 Ala. 107, 152 So. 462 (1933); Bundy v. Commercial Credit Co., 200 N.C. 511,
157 S.E..860 (1931).
NOTES
INTENT EXPRESSLY STIPULATED
The question as to which law applies when the parties have ex-
pressly stipulated in the contract that it shall be governed by the
law of a particular state is relatively simple. The parties have ex-
pressed their intention, and whether or not the contract is usurious
will be determined by the law of the place designated and by that
law only,15 even though it is usurious by that law but not usurious
by some other law to which it is equally referable. 16 The express
intent is subject, however, to what has been previously said in
regard to intention-that it is in good faith and not to evade the
usury laws of another state, and that some vital element of the loan
transaction is properly referable to the state intended. 17
Thus, if all the important elements of a loan transaction have
their situs in the same state, such transaction is governed, with
respect to the question of usury, by the laws of that state"' even
though the express provisions of that contract provide that the law
of another. state shall govern. 19
INTENTION NOT EXPRESSED
Where the parties have in no way expressed their intention as to
which law should govern in usury situations, the broadest and most
important rule is that the courts will presume that the parties in-
tended to contract with reference to the law of that jurisdiction
whose laws will uphold the contract, in preference to a law which
will invalidate it.20 This is founded on the principle that the parties
may, in good faith and with no intent to evade the usury laws,
make the contract according to their selection;21 but it is limited
to the law of that state having contacts vital to the transaction
which would make the contract enforceable. 21 It is in the interests
of commerce that the courts apply such a broad rule to uphold
15. Armstrong v. Alliance Trust Co., 88 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1937); United States Savings
f: Loan Co. v. Shain, 8 N.D. 136, 77 NW. 1006 (1898); Westchester Mortg. Co. v.
Grand Rapids & I.R. Co., 246 N.Y. 194, 158 N.E. 70 (1927).
16. See Midland Loan Co. v. Solomon, 71 Kan. 185, 79 Pac. 1077, 1078 (1905);
Goodo v. Colorado Inv. Loan Co., 16 N.M. 465, 117 Pac. 856, 857 (1911).
17. Armstrong v. Alliance Trust Co., 88 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1937).
18. J.I. Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Tomlin, 174 Mo. App.'512 161 S.W. 286
(1914).
19. United Drivers Supply Co. v. Commercial Credit Co., 289 Fed. 316, 319 (5th
Cir. 1923).
20. American Farm Mortgage Co. v. Ingrahamson, 174 Ark. 578, 297 S.W. 1039
(1927); Dupree v. Coss Mortgage Co., 167 Ark. 18, 267 S.W. 586 (1924); State v.
Rivers, 206 Minn. 85, 287 N.W. 790 (1939); Gilbert v. Fosston Mfg. Co., 174 Minn.
68, 216 N.W. 778 (1927); Mueller v. Ober, 172 Minn. 349, 215 N.W. 781 (1927);
2 WHARTON, Conflict of Laws § 507 (3d ed. 1905).
21. Mueller v. Ober, 172 Minn. 349, 215 N.W. 781, 782 (1927).
22. State v. Rivers, 206 Minn. 85 287 N.W. 790, 792 (1939).
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such contracts. 3 Thus, if the interest allowed by the law of the
place of performance is higher than that permitted at the place of
contracting, the parties may stipulate for the higher rate of interest
without incurring the penalties of usury.24 The converse of this
proposition is also well settled. If the rate of interest is higher at
the place of contracting than at the place of performance, the
parties may lawfully contract for the higher rate in this case also.2
Although the general rule as to "choice of intention" is limited to
the place where the contract is made or. at the place of per-
formance, it has been shown in the preceding section on intention
and the corresponding footnotes that there may be other circum-
stances which would permit a presumption that the parties con-
tracted with reference to the law of a state which would uphold
the contract. 26 However,- one must not forget that this principle
must stand the test of good faith and that a vital element of the
transaction must have so-me natural contact with the law of the
state which is applied.
NORTH DAKOTA VIEW
North Dakota has a statute 27 which provides that "a contract is
to be interpreted according to the law and usage of the place
where it is to be performed, or if it does not indicate a place of
performance, according to the law and usage of the place where
it is made." No North Dakota case law is to be found applying this
statute to cases involving usury; however, there is dictum in
United States Savings & Loan Co. v. Shain28 to the effect that if
the contract is silent as to which forum should govern, the parties
being residents of different states, the law would presume that they
contracted with reference to the laws of that state where the
contract would be valid and enforceable.2 9
23. Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403 (1927) Arnold v. Potter,
22 Iowa 194 (1867). See Lorenzen, Validity and Effect of Contracts in the Conflict of
Laws, 30 Yale L.J. 565, 655 (1921) and 31 Yale L.J. 53 (1922).
24. Berrian v. Wright, 26 N.Y. 208, 213 (1857). See Andrew v. Pond, 38 U.S. ,13
Pet.) 65 (1839).
25. See Miller v. Tiffany, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 298 (1864).
26. See Buchanan v. Drovers Nat'l. Bank, 55 Fed. 223 (6th Cir. 1893) (where law
applied was the jurisdiction in which the instrument was negotiated); Bascom v. Zedliker,
48 Neb. 380, 67 N.W. 148 (1896) (place where consideration given was used to deter-
mine intent); Nat. Mut Bldg. & Loan Assoc. v. Burch, 124 Mich. 57, 82 N.W. 837
(1900) (place where money to be used not controlling but to be used in determining
applicable law).
27. N.D. Rev. Code § 9-0711 (1943).
28. 8 N.D. 136, 77 N.W. 1006 (1898).
29. Cf. Storing v. National Surety Co., 56 N.D. 14, 215 N.W. 875 (1927) (the
validity of a contract is to be determined by the law of the place where it becomes
effective. Where a contract is executed outside of the state, but sent to this state for
delivery, the validity of the contract is to be determined by the law of this state unless.
a contrary intent is shown). Contra, Household Finance Corp. v. Sikorsld, Unreported,
Digested in 34 N.D. L. Rev. 86 (1958).
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It is interesting to note that California has&-ekactly the same'
statute"° as North Dakota. It has one case 1 dealing with usury and
conflict of laws which does not expressly mention the statute but
in effect holds as if the statute had been applied.
Even in cases not involving usury, the courts of North Dakota
have not applied this statute3" in determining the validity of a con-
tract when there is a conflict of laws. Instead, in such cases, North
Dakota courts are inclined to apply the law of the place where the
contract was made to govern validity.33 It appears that they have
merely used the statute to interpret the terms of a valid contract.3"
It is not certain if North Dakota courts would apply the Statute
or the dictum of United States Savings and Loan Co. v. Shain35 in
cases involving usury and conflict of laws. One might conclude,
however, that the above case would be authority for usury cases
in North Dakota. As a result this state would follow the weight of
authority, applying the law of the state which would uphold the
validity of the contract when there is no express stipulation there-
in, so long as that law has some natural connection with a vital
element of the contract.
G. EUGENE ISAAK
THE COURTS AND LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT
INTRODUCrION
Disproportioned legislatures stem from two causes. One reason
is that some state constitutions call for representation in one house
based on things other than population. The other reason is that
legislators fail to act on the provisions for reapportionment as out-
lined by their respective state constitutions.
Disproportion may also be of two different kinds. One type is
the unequal population of the districts, while the other variety is
encountered by physical manipulation of the shape of the districts.
This article will primarily deal with the legislators failure to re-
30. Cal. Civil Code Ann. § 1646 (West 1954).
31. Kraemer v. Coward, 2 C.A.2d 506, 38 P.2d 458 (1934) (where place of perfor-
mance was either ' California, Michigan, or at such place as holder of note should select.
Payment was actually made in California; therefore, California law was used to determine
usury).
32. N.D. Rev. Code § 9-0711 (1943).
33. Douglas County State Bank v. Sutherland, 52 N.D. 617, 204 N.W. 683 (1925)
(dissent would apply place of performance); Continental Supply Co. v. Syndicate Trust Co.,
52 N.D. 209, 202 N.W. 404 (1924).
34. Kansas City Life .Ins. Co. v. Wells, 132 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1943); Cosgrave v.
McAvay, 24 N.D. 343, 139 N.W. 693 (1913) (had the place of payment not been
stipulated, the contract is -to be interpreted according to the law and usage of the place
where it is made).
35. 8 N.D. 136, 77 N.W. 1006 (1898).
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